The evolutionary organization: avoiding a Titanic Fate
Peter A.C. Smith and Hubert Saint-Onge
< Introduction
The "Titanic syndrome"
How organizations change over time
Succumbing to the "Titanic syndrome"
The roots of the evolutionary organization
Principles of the evolutionary organization
The evolutionary organization-- an operational perspective
>>The evolutionary organization-- a management perspective
The evolutionary organization-- a new science perspective
A practical experience in building an evolutionary organization
Summary
(continued from The evolutionary organizaiton -- an operational perspective)
The evolutionary organization a management perspective
As Revans [70] has pointed out, "The pioneer of radical growth is the person able and ready to pose discriminating questions in conditions of ignorance, risk, confusion, and to hold his ground in doing so"; this well describes managements operational role in the EVO. Care must be taken that the risks are not viewed from an inappropriate paradigm; as Revans [71] further reminds us " even the penny post was seen by the Bench of Bishops to carry the risk of servant girls sending each other indecent letters." >
that the greatest gains come in the periphery rather than at the centre
Although largely accepted in formative organizations, " management by no one" [57] is a big cause for concern in KROs attempting to convert to EVOs. Itami [53] offers evidence that co-ordination effects emerge not so much from small groups of people communicating, but from letting large groups co-ordinate their activities in ways that have not been possible before. He makes the argument that the greatest gains come in the periphery rather than at the centre. Control is a desirable element of a normative organizational phase that we would like to embody in an EVO as long as the EVO was not thereby stabilized in a normative mode. A number of authors have described how management can exercise control in EVO-style organizations [59, 72-74}.
According to Kotter and Heskett [24] "The single most visible factor that distinguishes major cultural changes that succeed from those that fail is competent leadership at the top". Top managements main role in an EVO is to provide true leadership, look outward, create a general business vision and strategy, and build intellectual capital. The wellspring of real learning lies within the organization through aspiration, imagination and experimentation [75]. Senior management must not set strategy in isolation, but as partners with middle and supervisory operational management. For the EVO, in contrast to the KRO, strategy follows structure [76,77], but human behaviours, structure and energy must still be balanced in a systemic sense. The EVOs strategy is less a rational plan designed in the abstract, so much as an emergent phenomena or "craft strategy". This develops as the EVO learns about shifting conditions as it makes incremental adjustments, based on its limited understanding of the underlying relationships [32]. To make this approach effective, all management must be plugged in to "the new global commons" taking part in charting their future through intuitive thinking and scenario building [58].
" structure determines behaviour "
The organizational work of Beer [78] demonstrates that senior management does not have to exercise autocratic control. We agree with Fritz [66] that "structure determines behaviour". In an EVO managers think this way and ask themselves "What structure should I adopt to create the results I want to create?". Fritz recommends a structure that helps management bring into being the results they want. He recommends that managers develop an instinct for what works best; they must focus on outcomes and ask themselves "How do I get the outcomes I want?" The structure must be changed so that the gap between the vision and current reality leads to tension which seeks resolution in results. Old habits of KRO thinking cannot be broken through conflict manipulation, e.g. positive thinking or affirmation. There needs to be a start-up mentality developed so that the necessary tension is created which seeks resolution. Managers must speak like the founders and say "We can achieve these business outcomes."
There needs to be a start-up mentality developed
Senior management must ensure that the EVO contains a core shared assumption that the environment in which it exists is to some extent manageable. That is, as turbulence increases the leaders must increasingly emphasize that some level of successful control is possible. The EVO must also confirm its shared core values by demonstrating that the way for humans to behave is to be collaborative, proactive, innovative problem solvers, with high tolerance for diversity and individualism. This kind of alignment through leadership is capable of actually lifting the EVOs performance ceiling.
EVO planning does not rely on cause-effect modelling, and large social-systems optimization-design approaches, since such methods have had very mixed results for KROs. Many of the assumptions that must be made in these methodologies are unacceptable. In particular, the assumption that the context of the planning problem is unchanging, since in the real business world, unambiguous objectives, firm constraints and fixed relationships are atypical. In other words, there will not be "one best way" for the EVO. Because each decision for an organization such as an EVO is so unique, new planning methods have been called for. This has had huge implications for organizational design under conditions of uncertainty [6,790. As Bloom [80] says, "One cannot know or plan the future. One must will it. There is no program."
In spite of all the information available and relevant to the EVO, there is still little practical detail on how to go about building one. Leaders may be tempted to start to implement an EVO by trying to manufacture a perceived crisis, or by bringing in consultants every few years to wreak havoc, but this will not create an effective entry point. A few practical approaches to building the complex EVO have been described. For example, Ulrich and Lake [81] recommend that KROs attempting to become EVO-like organizations learn to use temporary systems effectively, so that they are likely to adopt more flexible arrangements even in routine operations. As this happens, they will become more explicit about social architecture and thereby stand a better chance of being self-renewing.
Schein [12] recommends creation of parallel learning systems in which new assumptions are learned and tested. He feels that if some part of the organization can learn an alternate way, and that way can be shown to work, then there will be less anxiety on its general introduction; trial and error in this case creates sense of safety. Meyer [82] recommends careful design and development of multifunctional teams, and changes to the structures that thwart such teams from functioning. Work processes must be re-engineered so that people can focus on value-added time and eliminate non-essential work. It requires a systemic change strategy and cycle time reaction methods and tools. Quinn Mills [76] provides much practical advice; Stack [83] and Stayer [84] give details for unleashing the individual.
In the final section of this article we will describe in practical terms how we have been involved in assisting a very large organization develop from a tradition-bound KRO into an EVO. This example will further illustrate that its not the size of the "vessel" that gives the EVO its characteristics, but how its parts function together and how it is steered.
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